To study differences in culture-based values, Richard
Shweder, an anthropologist, divided the moral order of each
culture into three categories that resemble those Cloninger
used to describe individuals. Shweder calls his categories ethics
of autonomy, which resembles self-directedness; ethics of
community, which resembles cooperativeness; and ethics of
divinity, which resembles self-transcendence.
The first of Shweder’s categories, the ethics of autonomy,
views each person as a free agent. Its main focus is maximizing
the rights of the individual and achieving personal
excellence. But the ethics of autonomy also balances the individual’s
right to self-fulfillment with a commitment to equal
autonomy for all. It is the predominant moral view in many
contemporary secular cultures.
The ethics of community turns this around by sacrificing
some autonomy for the benefits of having a defined place
in an organized group. It views the family and the community
as the most important entities, whose moral integrity
and reputation must be protected by each of its members.
It also views each person primarily in terms of social roles
and obligations rather than individual rights. Its main moral
themes—duty, hierarchy, and interdependence—have a central
place in traditional cultures.
The third category, the ethics of divinity, permeates the
traditional cultures in which religion plays a major role. It
views each person as a manifestation of a grand universal
design that transcends individuals and provides a spiritual
basis for moral behavior. In some versions, each person is
seen as a responsible bearer and representative of a holy legacy
rather than as a mundane practitioner of reciprocal altruism.
Breaking down a moral system into these three categories
is not just an abstract exercise. It can also help us recognize
how our own culture shapes our personal moral judgments.
Consider, for example, something as seemingly trivial as
the proper way to address your father. To most contemporary
Americans, who are largely governed by the ethics of
autonomy, it is acceptable to use his first name. But in the
traditional Hindu society that Shweder studied in India,
it is considered extremely disrespectful, a violation of both
family hierarchy (community) and the sacred natural order
(divinity).
The same approach can also help us understand the basis
for the passionate disagreement about the morality of abortion
by two groups of Americans who are each convinced
that they are right. In this case, the pro-choice group belongs
to a subculture that emphasizes a version of the ethics of
autonomy that gives priority to the individual woman’s right
to protect herself from what she considers a very harmful
outcome and downplays the right to life of the unborn fetus.
In contrast, the pro-life group belongs to a subculture that
emphasizes a version of the ethics of divinity that gives priority
to the sanctity of all human souls.
When considered in terms of the values of their cultures, it
becomes easy to see how two people who are equally endowed
with moral instincts and emotions can fervently defend such
different positions. In judging the character of an individual,
it is thus important to separate the person’s culture-specific
values from his or her rankings on those values that are
universally admired. Little relationship may exist between the
religious, political, and philosophical worldviews mandated
by their culture and their personal rankings on temperance,
courage, justice, humanity, wisdom, and transcendence.
